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In

endeavoring to b±ing forth

and to elucidate to

a certain extent the almost voluminous amount of matter conn the reports from the earliest date to the present

tained
time,

I realize the conment upon each decision from a loginal

and critical

standpoint to an ultimate harmonizing of each

would be impracticable as well as uncalled for.

But if

by

careful comparison and analysis of leading and pointed cases
inception to the

I can trace the law on this subject from its
latest decision of today,
harmony, logicallyterse
end.

and can bring them to a

and concise,

I shall have attained my

The law upon this subject consists of but few well

chosen short and logical rules.
careful

point of

,

Early formulated by a

judicious and considerate court,

and while each

principle has to some extent been criticised,

questioned,

and

its reasonableness severely debated upon, yet no principle of
this broad subject has ever been directly overruled or supplanted by other and later rules.
it

And this being the feet

appears by careful study that which has puzzled the courts

and taken up a grea.t amount of their time is not a discussion

of the law itself strictly, but its application to each ind,-

-2-vidual and collective sets of facts.

And such law being at

times severely stretche and at others possibly to leniently
applied gives rise to some discusion of its construction and
application thereof.
In

the early

.ase of Clark v.

court laid down the rule,

Fisher,

1 Paige,

171,

the

that a person to be capable of mak-

ing a will should be possessed of a sound and disposing mind
and memory,

with sense and judgment with reference to the

situation and the amount of his property,

and the relative

claims of the different persons who are or might be the object
The court taking into consideration the

of his bounty.

reasonableness of the will with reference to the omount of
his property and the situation of his relatives.

It

appears

that the court early saw the necessity of a somewhat string, nt
rule of capacity,
declaring,

and fully carried it

into execution by

that testator must be able to distinguish his rela-

tions with reference t(% all claims upon him,

(the testator,

and especially by taking into consideration and effect the

reasonableness of the will with reference to the amount of
his property.

And it

seems that the court woulT

infer from

such situation a testamentary deficiency even though such
testator have the most sane and disposing mind.'

-3And such was the law until we came to the celebrated case
of Stewart v.

Lispenard,

255.

26 Wend.

Alice Lispenard

whose will was souht to be established was entirely incapable of caring for herself,
was in

fact,

in

the least thing,
per,

early life

She

and probably was an imbecile.
would cry at

entirely helpless,

could not read or write,

had a violent temn-

but evidence showed that under good *reatment she ma~i-

fested signs of improvement, in that she could do little
things and carry on certain work, and could understand the
relation she bore to the household in
cpurt in ths

case,

general.

And the

I think not only only deviated from legis-

lativo intent, but practically made the wili o-F any person
of almost any mind whatever valid,

if

testator was sane and

had understanding to any extent whatever.

And practically

held imbecility of mind not to incapacitate the testator.
And the court in
tics

construing the statute viz,

and persons non compos mentis,

( idiots,

luna-

are disable from dispos-

ing of their property,) evidently saw in the expression " non

compos mentis" the legislative intent to allow individual s
if

not totally deprived of reason and sense toc dispose of

their property.

And the court

const rue ,,non compos menitis"

I think to mean that unless testator is

totally deprived of

-4reason he may md e his will,
of the court

in

other words in

the language

do not attempt to measure the extont of the

"

understanding of' testator if

he be hot totally deprived of

reason" and whether he is or not, even if he has a very amount
of sense his will stands as a reason for his action,
for that purpose deemed to be 11 compos montis..

and he is

And the

court practically holds tht a man may be able tc, mde- his will
and yet be unable to carry on his business.
From this decision it

may be gathered that the right of

testamanetary disposItion is inherit in the existence of
every being,

is

it

a natural right,

and not one given by posi-s

tive law,

but merely curtails and somewhat regulated and re-

strained.

It appears therefore from this theory to throw

what I think is
testators,

a very light and cloudy rule of action on

and allows altogether too great privileges,

in fmt

I think when it says that
places no standard whatever.
to
the court does not undertake/ m: easure extent of capacity bvt
it

merely to see if

and if

any capacity whatever and how little

exists,

any then the right of testamentary disposition is

be allowed.

This case is

trine of Clark v.

to

a marked devia 4 ion from the doc-

Fisher, which case construed ( compos ment is

to signify such an intellect and reason as would enable the

testator to know the relative claims and bounties of each of
his heirs, and understnnd clearly his property interests and
in

fact hold that a strong degree of rnini. must exist.
In Clarkv. Sawyer, 2 N.Y.,

v.

Lispenard,

is

499, the doctrine of Stewart

fully corroborated and followed.

However,

on reasonbng that mere imbecility of mind does not incapacitate

,

if testator be not

l1anatic or idiot.

The case of

Thompson v. Thompson, 21 Barb. 107, severely criticises the
doctrine of Stewart v.

Lispenard,

and practically says,

tha

if we are to take the doctrine of Stewart v. Lispenard as
authority, we must admit that if a person be not totally de.prived of mind and reason,
property,

he may lawfully dispose of his

and his will stands as the reasons for his actions.

And the court still further declares in Thompson v. Thompson,
that in

deciding the Lispenard case,

that the discussion of

the principles by carefully prepared opinions was
the opinion was by the Senate,
not a single one brought. in

And they still

omitted,

as

and all parties being busy,

a prepared and written opinion.

further declare and it

of the law upon this entire subject,

corroborates my theory
that it

was not a dis-

cusiion of the law but merely an appliuation to the facts in
the given case.

And no opinion was ever ofically announced

-6by a majority of the court,

and this was by the way one of the

great reasons for the court revision in 1846,.
ing up the court says:
decision in

'

And in wind-

they are of the opinion that the

the Lispeard case has not declared or establishe

beyond question any principle of controlling,

indisputable

authority, on the subject of testamentary capacity, and declares
that we are still

free to examine the propositions contained

in the opinion of Senator Verplack,
the court in

and to inquire whether

passing upon the validity of a will do not meas-

ure the extent of the understanding of the testator, and if
not totally deprived of reason,
reason for his action.

tha

his will stands as a re

But nevertheless it appears from an-

cient writers that the great body of persons regulated by the
law are included under the terms (non compos mentis
Lord Coke, classified non compod mentis as
1.

Idiots,

2.

Those utterly deprived by sickness.

so

Lunatics.

4.

Drunkards.

).

And

:

And from this classification was evidently excluded any
alienation of mind which did not constitute a person a lunatic, idiot,

or drunkard.

And Lord Hardiwicke held, ths£

-7unless testator suffered from a total disability of mind the
validity of his will could not be affected.

But it appears

tha subsequent to Coke and Hardiwicke, the wisdom of the
above rule, which is practically the Stesart v. Lispenard rule
has been much questioned, and to use the words of the court,
in Thompson v. Thomps~n,

"

And within a comparitively recent

time the law has worked itself out of the state of great uncertainty on this subject and has become in a measure clear
and intelligent.
(

And English decisions as well as American,

and which I may state were entirely overlooked by the court

in the Lispenard cme

)

have questioned the rule of the

decision, and made the law somewhat logical and certain.

The

law for more than twonty five years previous to 1855, evidently contemplates three instedd of two (

idiots and lunatics)

states of mind, lunacy, idiocy, and unsoundness of mind,
latter being emphatically distinguished from lunacyad

the
idiocy

And our Revised Statutes recognixe this by clearly stating
that there is a material difference between the first two

( idiocy and lunacy )and unsoundness. I R.S. 719, sec. lO.marginal, and also 2 R.S. 5f3.

And therefore, the question now

is if not a lunatic or idiot had he unsound mind, the latter
refering to his. mental d ficiency arising from disease,

-0

-

infancy, old age, grief, etc., and the latter terms unsoundness of mind or non compos mentis, in its fixed legal meaning
means, free from liunacy, idiocy, or unsoundness of mind,
which would render testator incaoable of judging rightly.
The case of Brown v. Torrey, may be said to be authority for
the Lispenard case, but I think that from a critical examination of the same, that in that case the testator had capacity
which was fully establish(d by a preponderance of evidence,
and the court itseli

says:

"

That while possibly recognizing

the undoerlying principlos of the Lispenard case, there is no
necessity in this decision for pushing the principle to any
such extent, for we have seen that testator had capacity,"
intimating that the Lispenard rule was severely stretched in
its inception.,
Watson v. Lynch, 28 Barb.,

53, is possibly sometimes

cited as followvn g the Lispenard case, but I think even in
this case there was evidence that testator was possessed of
more than ordinary ability.
We are now about to enter upon what appears to be a new

epoch in the law of testamentary capacity.

We are I think

about to deviate materially from the doctrine of Stewart v.
Lispenard, and though we shall not entirely throw aside the

-9doctrine of this case,

we shall at least be compelled to say
Lispenard by the best and

that the doctrine of Stewart v.

most logical authority henceforth, and subsequebt to 1862,
should be followed,
The great

and should be materially modified.

case of Delafield v.
Hehry Parish,

the new epoch.

Parish,

thetestator

25 N.Y.,
in

this proceedings

was a wealthy and hihgly cultured merchant of N.Y.,
made a will in

182,

and, afterwards in

1849,

0, marks

he had

he suffered a

severe attack from appoplexy, which entirely paralyzed his
left

side,

and which loft his mind impaired to the extent as

claimed by contesta ts,
unknowing,

that he was entirely helpless and

and was tota ly non compos.

claimed that the

While the proponent

codicils made subsequent to the stroke were

the work of a sound and disposing mind,
could not communicate his ideas,
business and carried it

on.

and although Mr.Parish

yet he readily understood

And the court held,

that testa-

tor did not possess sufficient mind to make a valid and subsisting will on the following theory and pr&nciple, that in

law,

C I quote from opinion) the only stasndard as to mri~tal

capacity in all wh~o are not idiots or lunatics,
the fact whether the testator is
mentis,

is

found in

compos mentis or non compos

as the terms are used in their fixed legal meaning.

-10And such being the rule,

the question in

every case is,

capacity to make a will,

the testator as compos mentis,

not had he capacity to make the will prokduced.
mentis,

had
and

If compos

he could make any will however complicated,

and if

non compos he can make no will however, not the simplest.
I think that this case while not directly overruling the
Ltspenard case,

yet it

feels itself

C I quote a few words from

radically different principles,
opinion)

The cas(.

much discussion in

of Stewcart v.

Lispehard has challenged

this state and has not been regarded with

favor by the bench or bar.
it

free to establish new and

The circumstances under which

was heard and decided on the part of the court are such as

to carry with it little if any weight of althority,

ad if

that case is held good the will of a person conceded to be
but slightly removed from an idiot in

intellectual

power,

may

at any time be admitted as a valid and subsisting will." This
decision in Delafield v. parish, seems to have come forth to
fill a long felt want in the line of legal principles on the

subject of testamentary capacity.
standard,

to elevate the law,

it

seeks to raise the

and to carry out the legisla-

tive intent, wh ich never intended that a I~rson of even slight
mind should have the responsible and valua~ble right of testa-

-lLispenard,

mentary capacity which the doctrine of Stewart v.
declared thet

it

it

might have.

reasonable that if

seems to be logical

and

a person has suffi.ient mind to make one

will he ought to be able to make any will however complicated
seeems unreasonable and unjust t1xt a person might be

and it

said to make a given a will,

but not have mind enough to make
I think as it

And the question is

any will.

should be,

has

he compos mentis, as that word is used in its fixed legal
meaning,
tion,

i.e.

has he sufficient mind to understand his situa-

the situation of his property and of his relation,

and

of the position of those who are or ought to be objects of
his bounty,

does he sufficiently understand his business,

he carry it

on in

a judiciuus manner,

answered in

can he carry on a com-

and can he understfzdldall

Paritively shrewd convers tion,
these questions if

can

seems to

the affirmative,

bring his capacity within that rule of compos mentis established by the statutes of the State of New York.
Reynolds v. Root,

Delafield v.

Parish,

and unreasonable

62 Barb.,

251,

bears out the law of

and declares that a wvill however unjust

4 may be in its provisions,

is

valid and

good if

testator was coiupos montis as that term is

legally

used.

And that failure of memory does not incapacitate.

-12And. the court says that,

"

no greater injustice could be done

in many tnstances by a testator than so to dispose of tis
property as to be what the world would call just.'
Gamble v. Gamble, 39 Barb., 373, also substantLitos the
theory of Reynolds v. Root, and holds that, the apparent injustice of a testator to members of his family, although evidence to be taken into consideration in examining testator's
mind it is not enough of itself to invalidate the will.
Also Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.,

153, says that the

simple fact that the testator may have died a few minutes
after making his will is m rely evidence and not proof of incapacity, and he is presumed sane until proven otherwise, and
that the fact that he gave ($50,.000)to his second wife and
only ($500) to his child is only evidehce but not proof that
testator was non compos.
In the case of Ean v. Snydcr, 46 Barb. ,230, the court
substantiates the principle of Delafield v, Parish, and declares those principles a safe guide to follow in testamentary disposition, and that it

s not essential for courts to

extend their inquiries beyond the rules stated in that case.
And they declare the true question to be was the testator
compos or non compos as those words are used in their fixed

-13The court also declares the rule of Stewart

legal meaning.
v.

Lispenard,

to be qualified by that of Delafield v.
rule in

I know of no better synopsis of tiB
Parish,

than that given by the court in

ling v.

VanCuren,

is

Delafield v.

the case of VanGuis-

this court after affirming and declaring

anew the doctrine of Delafiild v.
that it

Parish.

essential that

Parish,

substantially says,

have such a capacity as

testattor

his

to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property,

relation to the persons who were or should or might have been
the object of his bounty,

and the scope and bearings of the

provisions of his will,

le must in

the language of the

cases have sufficient active memory to collect

in his mind

without prompting the particulars or elements of the business
to be transacted,

and to hold them within his mind a suffi-

cient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to one another,
ment in

and be able to form some rational

relation thereto.

power to do these things is

A person who has sufficient mental
I think within the meaning and

intent of the Statute of Wills,
memory,

and is

judg-

a person of sound mind and

competent to dis~ose of his property by will.

In the matter of the Foreman Will,

54 Barb,

274,

the only case subsequent to the time of Delafield v.

1 see
0oarish,

-14which in
V.

any way attempts to bear up the doctrine of Stewart
The court puts rorward as a rule that if

Lispenard,.

testator had capacity to make the will produced, thet
was sufficiently composmentis, to make a given will
a person of sound mind

within the statute,

the

if he
,

basing its

he was
opin-

ion on the idea that if testator knew enough to make a very
simple will in

itself

it

was evident that he had a sane mind,

an§ could make any other,.

But the conclusion of the c Lurt

as to his being able to necessarily make a more complicated
one seems to be unfounded and entirely without reason,
while the case is
Lispenard,

yet its

and

clearly I think a modifier of Stewart v.
doctrine and reasoning from the begginning

seems to be faulty, as it is very evident that a person might
be able to make asingle will not complicated in
and yet if

called jxpon to do business,

and long will,

any degree,

and make a complicated

and to use and bring into effect his memory,

he would utterly fail.
The case of

inney v.

Johnson,

60 Barb.,

and substantiates the doctrine of Delafield v.
declares that it
apply it

be the law it

69,

follows

Parish and

only remains for the court to

to given cases as they arise,

and declares that the

"sound mind" required by the statute to qualify the person to

-15cannot b(; satisfied by any different rule.

make a will

Smith v. Foreman, 7 Lansing,443, qualifies entirely
Delafield v.
is

Parish,

and declares that Stewart v.

Lispenard,

practically overruled by saying that" To enable a Im rson

to dispose of his property by will it

is

not enough that he

should be found to be possessed of some degree of intelligence
and mind,

he must in

hend the

ture and effectoof the act ke is performing, the

addition have sufficient mind to compre-

relations be holds to the various individuals who might
naturally be expected to become objocts of his bounty,
be capable of making a rational
Coit v.

Patchen,

77 N*Y.,

doctrine of Delafield v.
3 N.Y.SUpp.,

and to

selection of them."

533,

declares and modifies tie

Parish, as is also the soi1le will

359.

The case of Townsend v.

Bogart,

5 Redfield,

a certain extent modifying Stewart v.

Lispenard,

93,

while to

fundamentaly

I think rests for its decision on the theory of Delafield v
Parish.

The decedent

in

the above case *as very illiterate

studdered badly, had bad temper,
ten, would get
to school

could not count more than

ost on familiar streets,

or the period of three years,

read or write,

and the court held,

although having been
yet he could not

that decedent was not of

-10sound and dsiposing mind as required by the statute,

and said

further that while the court did not intend to measure intelligenoe and define the exact amount of capacity or knowledge
a decedent must have before mwking his will yet,

it

does re-

quire such a mind as to be able to distinguish his propery
rights and the names of those whorare the natural objects of
h-is bounty,

and that he should have a memory sufficient

carry all such facts

in his head and to be able to clearly

see the entire situation

. -,t nevertheless such memory and

knowledge may be somewhat obscure and -yet
exist.

to

capacity may

In this case espeeially is the term compos mentis

liable to mislead and in

the wvords of the court

"

Not all

who

come within that description being compeent to mak.e a will,
and further says,

that in

Stewart v.

Lispenard,

the

a person

being of weak understanding, so he being neither an idiot nor
a lunatic is
estate."

no objection in

law to his disposing of his

Courts will not measure extent of understanding if

a man be legallycompos

.entis, be he wise of unwise,

the disp ser of' his own property,
reason for his own acts,.
the term compos ment is
to execute a will is

he is

and his will stands as the

And the court further says that

f'or th e purpose of unabling a person

laid down fully in Delaf'ield v.

Parish.

-17Therefore while following Stewart v.

Lispenard in

thet

possibl

1will as perStewart

and unwise and weak mineded mma may make

v. Lispenvad, yet nevertheless he must have sufficient knowledge and memory to understand the situtaion of his property
and those who are the natural objects of his bounty,

practica-

ly therefore coming down to the doctrine in Delafield v .Pari sh.
Matter of Vedder,

14 St.Rep.,

470,

substantiates Delafiel

v. Parish.
The real point in

issue is

testamentary capacity or in-

capacity at the precise date of transaction.

And an in-

struction that testator had testamentary capacity if

he had

full and intelligent knowledge of his property, of thode entitled

to his bounty,

and of the nature of hiis acts,

he need no be capable of making contracts

and that

and doing business

generally, does not call for too high a degree of capacity.
And unsou.
will.

mind produced by disease does not prevent a valid

lIe may still have a disposing mind, while on the other

hand loss of memory entirely destroys testam~entary capacity.
But mere impairment of memory does not.

And the use of

morphine by testator is merely evidence and oes not prima
facie incapacitate.

Nor does extreme feeble healh incapa-

-18-

incapacitate,
epilepsy.
At.

689;

nor does fact that testator was suffering from

1 N.Y.Supp.
38 N.W.

392;

120;
7 N.E.

12

12 At.Q12;

17 N.Y.,

797;

056;

5 N.E.

17

;

12 N.E.236;

7 N.E. 829 ;.
The will of a lunatic may be admitted to probate

if

shown by proof to have been made during a lucid interval.
Thus is a will established prima facie and conforms

to

t1e

coneensus of authority, but there must be clear and convincing proof of lucid intorvals, Gumerbault,v. Public Adm. 4
Bradford.
The will of an illeterate
easily excitable,

person who may be capricious,

and not only being frugal but who denies

himself comforts of life is a good one.
understands the "ituation and if
to his dictations exactly,
understandingly
valid.

In

nor is

it

the will was made according

and was afterwards read to him

and he acquiesced to the will it

re Voohees,

Suicide is

If he thoroughly

is

good and

27 St Rep.

not of itself

sufficient to invalidate a will

presumptive evidence of insanity on the issue.

But

suggestions of insanity would be severely and critically impaired, by showing that decedent was tired of this world, etc.
and took no enjo~rment in it,

and often expressed intentions

-19to remove himself from earth saying and expressing disbelief
in

the hereafter.

re Card,

In

The case of C mpbcll v.
ple laiddovm in
laid down in
overrules

Clark v.

Campbell, holds that the princi-

Fisher,

Delafiold v.

Stewart v.

20 St Rep.

and which conforms to those

Parish is

Lispenard,

good and logical and

as trying merely to apply and

not to argue the law.
In some extro,;c cases where it

is

apparent upon the face

of the will and from all the surronding
pears that the will is
ion and is
ions,

from its

such will is

circumstances it

ap-

against the dictates of natural affect-

very conceptions unnatural

in

its

provis-

evidonce of mental defect which may re-

quire explanation.

In

re Budlong,

126 N.Y.

And again it h

has been held that where a testator made his will on his
death bed and he was so weak physically as to be unable to
T.ake

his mark without assistance, that such facts were not

sufficient to invalidate the will provided that testator was
rational.

And it has been absolutely held and without any

opposition that mere eccentricity of decedent will not invalidate.

In re M~erriam,

42 St.Rep.

Any proof that testator was somewhat forgetful though
capable of appreciating the nature of' his act and the proper

.20.
objects of his bounty, and of designating without prompting
one in whose favor he wished the will drawn,
hold wills good.
lish

while a man's ability to traasmt with

judgment and discretion if

is

there

sufficient to

And failing memory does not per se estab-

want of capacity,

dence of capacity,

is

ery strong if not conclusive

evi-

And it appears that in all late cases

recognized but the one general standard compos or

non compos as that expression is used in its fixed legal
meaning.

In re Stewart, 36 St Rep.
In re Dates, 35 St. RE.p.
In re Williams, 40 St. REp.
.hrite v. Ross, 48 St. Rep.
oFinn, 54 St. sep.
In ro

5 Miiscellaneous.

In re Wheeler,
In re Jones,
It

....

O

.

has been my purpose through the comparison of cases

to take each line separately

,

that is,

to first analyze

those under the general subject of unsoundness of mind

.

And

I have thus far confined myself to this technical division.
And have not touched upon the subject of insane delusions,
which subject bears a close resemblanee and is
of such subject of non compos mentis.

indeed a part

And some writers have

gone so far as to say that the only test of unsoundn~ess of
mind is

the existence or non~.existence of insane delusions.

And while in a few particular cases I admit this as being the

proper rule,
is

yet in

the large majority of cases I think there

no analogy and hence I will give the law upon that divisstands at the present day.

ion as it

A person may be said to be under a delusion when he concedes smething extravagant to exist which has no existence
whatever save in

his own heated imagination.

But he is

incapable of being reasoned out of that conception.

And the

existenc- or noexistence of such delusions forms to a certain
extent the test as to compos or non compos menitis,
be sd

tat

delusion in

are convortible terms,

this sense of the word

and it

may

ad insanity

and a will made according to and under

the imediate influence of such a drilsion which has not only
weakened but perverted testator's

judgment and understanding

in relation to subjects connected with the provisions of the
will, so as to exercise a controlling influence in the disposition of his property is

I think not th

of sound mind and understanding,

will of a parson

on that subject on which he

is supposed to exercise his powers in making the will.

as an illustration it

And

would not be sufficient to justify the

rejection of the will that a testator in other respects competent entertained the mistaken idea that one of his daughters
was illegitimate if

it

was not the effect of an insane delus-

-22A :person persistently believing supposed facts which

ion.

have no real existence against all evidenco of probability
and conducting himself upon the assumption of their existence
is

so far as such facts are concerned under an insane delusion

as if

a testator at time of making his will is

any such delusion in

laboring under

respect to those who would naturally

have been the objects of his testamentary bounty, and the
court can see that the dispositions were or might have been
caused or affected by such delusions,

such instruments would

not pass as a valid will.
It

is

said by some writers that insane delusions consist

in a belief of facts which no rational person would believe,
and a person ma

have insane delusions as to some things and

not as to others,

and it

makes no diffe--ence how many such

delusions he may have provided they do not bear upon the
subjedt matter of the disposition etc.
monomania invalidates

Partial insanity or

a will without doubt which is

a direct

offspring thereof,

though the testator's

be unimpoeached.

And to create a delusion which will annm.l

general capacity

a will something more than an unwarranted conclusion from
existing facts must be drawn by the evidence.

it

is

necess-

ary that the conclusions contorting the mine. should be un-

-23founded and persisted in against all evidence indicating that
the facts described had no real existence.

And in Phillip v

Chater, 1 Demarest, 35, the test of delusion is not whether
the judge or juror would have believed such a thing but can
he understand how any man in possession of his senses could
have believed such a thing.

In re Smith, 53 St. Rep.
In re Lockwood, 28 St.Rep.
Leslie v. Leslie, 15 Wk. Dig.
In re Keeler, 3 Supp.

Lathrop v Borden, 5
15 N.W. 545.

.un.5(0.

19 N.VI., 132

F7N.E.

S.23

It is a well fovncxed &octrine and I will lay it down absolutely that spiritualism in itself is not sufficient to
invalidate a will.

But to render it so it must appear that

1evtsions of' the will were made in consequence of' some
strang imaginative fact supposed to exist and resulting from
the effects of spiritualism.

15 N.W.,578;

In re Vedder, 14

St.Rcp., 470.
It has been held that long continued inebriety although
resulting in occasional insanity does not require proof of a
lucid interval to gibe validity to the

ts of the drunkard,

as is required where general insa~nity is proven,

but of

course where the practice has practically produced permanent
derangement
think tha

of mind it
it

would be otherwise

it

seems.

And I

can safely be said that noither habitual intox-

ication nor the actual stimulus of liquors at time of executing a will will incapacitate a testator unless the excitoment
be such as to deaden his faculties and pervrt
And it

his judgmnut.

may be safely laid doi-n that the fact that the testator

at the time of making the will was under the influence of
liquor will not incapacitate him.
In

re Reed., 3 Conley,.

2 N.W.,

1084.

Peck v.

Cary,

27 N.Y.,

9.

The proponent of the will of an aged man for probate of
is

not required to prove that the testator's

were those of a man in middle life
power.

It

is

enough if

and of impaired physical

he has sufficieht mental power to

fully comprehend the nature of the act he is
of his children,

mental faculties

doing

and the position of his property.

may be saiid there is

,

claims
And it

no presumption against a will because

made by a person of advanced age.

Nor incapacity to make

the will be inferred from an enfeeliled

condition of body.

lie

simply muast have sufficient intelligence to realize the mean-

ing of his acts and their necessary consoque-_-Oe.
In re Wh(eler, 5 Miseel.
38 N.Wv., 392.
Horn v. Pullnan, 7_ N.Y.,

270.

Tiaving now I think touched uon all the different phases
of mental irmpaizrment which could. possibly arise,

and having

traced them from their beginning to their fullest developient
it

only remains for me in

in

a few words show in

order to complete my intention,

to,

a clear concise and terse form the law

upon this entire subject as it

stands today.

The legislature early enacted into out
provision that all idiots,

luhatics,

statutes the

and persons of unsound

mind should not be able to dispose of their

property by will.

And by so providingr plainly stated that there were
classes of persons incapaditNted,

three

idiots first, lunatics

second, who from the very fact of their total laUk of intelligence of whatsoever order were incapacitated.,
unsound mind.

And it

is

and person of

upon this last exclusionary

that the authorities hinged almost exclusively.

clause

And as I

have followed from the beginning two different and distinct
lines of oases,

namely,

The Stewart v.

Lispenard doctrine,

of which the theory was that tl2 possess ing of unsoundness of

-20mind Eeant total lack of mind, or else no person was incapacitate , in the felafield v. Parish line of authority, which

the statute of unsoundness of mind to

construed the term in

mean persons non compos mohtis Cs those words are used in
their fixed legal meaning.
thorities and there is

I have traced both line of au-

but one conclusion to come to,

that while the theory of Stewart v.

nanely,

Lispehard has not been

specifically overruled and set aside it

did not lay down any

It did not argue the law
absolute and binding principles.
but merely applied it as it appeared in an offhand way to the

senator court, who prepared no opinion upon it whatever.

I

therefore say that it left the field clear of all binding pro
precedents,

and that field was soon after taken possession of

by the Delafield v.

Parish line of auth.rity,

which is

to my

thinking the only logical rule which could be brought forth
from the statute as embodying the true legislative intent.
And therefore the principles laid down by that court

must

govern,

and beyond question they do as the theory of that

case is

followed in a long line of cases cited from that day

to the present.

It

was laid downu therefore in felafield v.

Parish and as stated as the law of today, that to bring a
testator within the provision of the statute relating to per-

-27sons of unsound mind, it is essential that he should have
sufficient capacity to comprehend §erfectly the condition of
his property, his relations to tlB persons who weve or should
or might be the objects of his bounty and the scope abd bearing of the provisions of his will.
of tu

He must in the language

cases have sufficient actibe memory to collect in his

mind without proptin

the particulars or elements of the

business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a
s sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to each other,
rational judgment in

and to be able to form some

relation to them,

and I may say that

a

teetator who has sufficient mental power to do these things
is within the meaning mad intent of tje Statute of Wills, a
person of sound mind and memory,
of his proporty by viill.

and is

And the

competent to dispose

:question always is

was

testator compos mentis or non compos as those words are used
in

their fixed legal meaning,

make the will In

question,

andnot did he

ave capacity,

but was he compos mentis,

to

and if

so

he could make any will however difficult.
The test of delusion is
The questio

also a valid one and is

competent.

always being did testator havo or was he labor-

ing under such a misapprehencsion of facts as to lead him to

-28make dispositions contrary to what he otherwise would, if so
then such delusion sufficiently shows insanity aid mental
unsoundness it plainly appearin that if the testator was

labori,.,g under such a delusion he could not

,-roperly

stand his property rights nad interests of those who

underought

to be objects of his bounty.
As to drunkenness, a word will suffice,

it is not

sufficient to invalidate a will that it be shown that testator was an habitual drunkard or oven to show he was under its
influence at time of making such di s-,osition and it is not
necessary to show lucid intervals, it rust only appear tha
he understood the nature of his w ts and the rights of those
who ought to be objects of his bounty.
As to spiriualism, it does not of itself invalidate the
will, and. in order to so act it must be conclusivelt,shown th
that by aviid through such belief testator was lead to make
such dispositions in

a different maMner

than he otherwise

would hadnot the belief existed.

As to old age,.
by reason of old age,

There is no presumption 6xf incapacity
and in order to incapacitate it

must be

shown that tcstator was physically to enfeebled to understand
his property rights and the interests of those who ought to

-29be objects of his bounty.

And

,,Tith

of thought.

these explaheations I have completed ny outline
I -!ave sought to

trace the New York law upon

earliest

inception to the present day.

this subject from its

And in so doing I am not unaware of the fact that

repetition

and quotation have been frequently and of a necessity often
But to try and state the principles espec-

indulged in.

ially upon this ubject and not to rfer oonstbntly to the decisions for my authority could but necessarily result in a
confused mass of thought unprecedented and unsubstantiated.
And therefore if

trOtigh this course by me followed you are

able to trace the law in its course and to discover the true
legislative intent as embodidod in
original intention as I stated in

the New York Statutes,

my

the beginning will have

been fulfilled.
Glenn Mionroe Dennis.
Ithaca N.Y.,

May,

18,

1894.

